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The purposes of this study are two-fold. First, we draw from the findings of prior 
literature reviews and theoretical studies to develop two hypotheses geared towards 
explicating the economic consequences of fair valuation. We respectively refer to 
these hypotheses as the business model hypothesis and the hardness hypothesis. 
Second, we test these hypotheses by reviewing previous research from the top three 
journals in the field. We find that the relationship between fair valuation and the 
usefulness of accounting information varies as a function of the business model 
employed by the entity under consideration. We also find that the effects of fair 
valuation are contingent upon differences in the hardness with which relevant assets 
and/or liabilities are measured. Overall, our results suggest that differences in an 
entity’s business model and the hardness associated with fair value accounting 
measurement have measurable effects both on valuation and contracting usefulness 
of accounting information. 
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In the past two decades, the accounting standards of the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and Financial Accounting Standards 
Board (FASB) have changed dramatically. Most notably, fair value 
accounting has expanded in scope, contents, and timing, as both organizations 
have begun to apply fair valuation to most financial assets, liabilities, and 
derivatives. Many researchers examine the valuation usefulness and/or 
contracting usefulness of fair value accounting, however these studies show 
mixed results. These results also may raise the following questions: Does fair 
value accounting provide decision-usefulness information to investors and 
other contracting parties? What are constrains of fair value accounting? 
In this study, we review prior literature that has explored the economic 
consequences of fair valuation and defined the problems that resulted from it. 
In doing so, we seek to achieve two complementary goals. First, we review 
and investigate the reported findings from past literature reviews (Barth et al., 
2001; Landsman, 2007; Laux, 2012; Tokuga, 2012) and theoretical studies to 
develop two hypotheses that delineate the economic consequences of fair 
valuation. These hypotheses are respectively referred to as the business model 
hypothesis and the hardness hypothesis. The second goal of this study is to 
test these hypotheses through a review of salient literature that has been 
published in top accounting journals since 2000.  
  Through our investigation, we find that the effects of fair value accounting 
usefulness correlate with the differences in the entity’s business models (e.g., 
financial vs. non-financial investments). We also find that the effects of fair 
valuation vary as a function of the differences in the hardness with which 
relevant assets and/or liabilities are measured. Taken together, our results 
suggest that an entity’s business model and the hardness with which fair value 
accounting is measured affect both valuation usefulness and contracting 
usefulness of accounting information. 
  The methods and results reported in this study primarily contribute to the 
accounting literature. By clearly operationalizing our hypotheses, future 
empirical research related to the economic consequences of fair value 
accounting becomes possible. This study also has implications for 
standard-setting in accounting. For example, empirical results from marginal 
cases may inform the development of future accounting standards.  
  The remainder of this study is organized in a number of interrelated, but 
distinct sections. In Section 1 and 2, we present the theoretical background of 
this study and develop the two hypotheses to be tested. To test these 
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1. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND  
 
1.1. Findings from prior literature reviews  
 
The findings from past literature reviews suggest that the economic 
consequences of fair value accounting and/or the usefulness of fair value 
information vary by industry and an objecting property of fair valuation 
(Barth et al., 2001; Landsman, 2007; Laux, 2012; Tokuga, 2012). Empirical 
evidence of this nature has generally suggested that fair valuation on financial 
assets held by financial institutions is value-relevant
1
. 
Landsman (2007) reviews extant literature on the capital market that has 
examined the usefulness of fair value accounting information for investors 
prior to the onset of the global financial crisis between 2007 and 2008. In his 
review, he classifies research related to value relevance into three categories: 
US-based research from the 1990s with a particular focus on banks, 
international research
2
, and US-based stock option research after 2000. 
Evidence from this literature suggests that the degree to which disclosed and 
recognized fair values are informative to investors is affected by measurement 
error and the source of the estimates (i.e., management or external appraisers). 
For example, prior studies suggest that managers may be incentivized to use 
discretion in selecting input parameters for fair value estimates of employee 
stock options based on valuation models and/or firm-specific information,. 
Using evidence from studies performed during the financial crisis, Laux 
(2010) examines the relationship between financial reporting and financial 
stability
3
 and came to several notable conclusions. First, fair value accounting 
does not necessarily cause widespread fire sales of assets or contagion. 
Second, accounting practices and regulations may have contributed to the 
financial crisis by allowing several banks to delay their actions. Third, the 
origin of the financial crisis may have been lax rules that allowed banks to 
encounter financial and regulatory problems despite increases in share prices. 
Fourth, fair values can be relevant for assets that a bank intends to hold until 
maturity if that bank is heavily reliant on short-term financing. Finally, the 
recognition of fair value does not satisfactorily replace information that 
allows investors to judge a bank’s risk exposure and the validity of reported 
fair values. 
 Some research on fair valuation has focused on the reliability (i.e., hardness) 
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of fair value measurements (see Landsman, 2007; Laux, 2012), but these 
studies have neglected to consider the effect of an entity’s business model on 
fair valuation. Tokuga (2012) addressed this deficiency, suggesting that an 
entity’s business model significantly relates to the usefulness of fair valuation. 
Using working papers that have appeared in the Social Science Research 
Network (SSRN) and published academic manuscripts, he comprehensively 
reviews empirical studies on fair valuation. Tokuga’ s (2012) work shows that 
fair valuation for financial instruments positively affects the support function 
for investors, but fair valuation for non-financial instruments negatively 
affects. Further, he finds that whereas fair valuation for financial institutions 
positively affects the support function for investors, fair valuation in 
non-financial institutions negatively affects. 
In sum, findings from past literature reviews suggest that there are two key 
factors that influence the economic consequences of fair value accounting: 
differences in the reliabilities of measurement scales for relevant assets, and 
the entity’s business model.  
 
1.2. Usefulness of accounting information 
 
It is clear that the overall purpose of financial accounting is to provide useful 
information for assisting in the making of economic decisions. As outlined by 
the IASB (2010): 
 
The objective of general purpose financial reporting is to provide financial 
information about the reporting entity that is useful to existing and potential 
investors, lenders and other creditors in making decisions about providing 
resources to the entity. Those decisions involve buying, selling, or holding 
equity and debt instruments, and providing or setting loans and other forms 
of credit. 
 
In addition, some researchers identify two sub-objectives of financial 
accounting: to provide valuation-relevant information (especially to market 
participants), and to provide contracting-relevant information (especially to 
other contracting party such as lenders and creditors; Watts and Zimmerman, 
1986; Christensen and Demski, 2003; Gassen, 2008). Valuation-relevant 
information helps users “in assessing the amounts, timing, and uncertainty of 
prospective cash receipts” (FASB, 1978: para. 37) and is thus useful for 
evaluating corporate value. The most important qualitative characteristic of 
this information is its “relevance.” Contracting-relevant information helps 
users to evaluate management stewardship and performance (FASB, 1978: 
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para. 50). The most important qualitative characteristic of this information is 
“reliability”4. Following Gassen (2008), we treat “decision usefulness” as the 
general purpose of financial accounting and “valuation usefulness” and 




2. HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
1.2. Business model  
 
As it relates to accounting standards, a business model refers to the ways in 
which entities differ in terms of their investments or incentives related to 
resource allocation decisions, and the value creation process of an entity 
(EFRAG et al., 2013). For instance, IFRS 9 requires all financial assets to be 
classified on the basis of the entity’s business model for managing financial 
assets and the contractual cash flow characteristics of the financial assets 
(IASB, 2009: IN 10). More specifically, IFRS 9 suggests that the entity’s 
business model does not depend on management’s intentions for an individual 
instrument, but should be determined at a higher level of aggregation. As a 
result of these stipulations, a single entity may have more than one business 
model for managing its financial assets, so classification need not be 
determined at the reporting entity level (IASB, 2009: B4.2). 
Leisenring et al. (2012) discuss how an entity’s business model might affect 
an entity’s financial reporting practices. They conclude that 
business-model-based accounting preserves comparability, but does not impair 
relevance.  
  Saito (2009) discusses the relevance of business models in the context of 
whether the entity’s basic operations relate to financial investments or 
nonfinancial investments. He suggests that the risk position of investments 
and performance measurements from the resolution of uncertainty correspond 
to substantial characteristics of an entity’s investments. Although accounting 
standards determined by rules related to valuation and recognition rules 
depend on asset type (financial vs. nonfinancial), Saito (2009) finds that  the 
substance of investments is the most important factor.  
Saito’s (2009) research also provides a useful matrix comprised 
characteristics of investments and types of assets (see Table 1). In his matrix, 
financial investments refer to those investments in which investors or 
management personnel hold assets to earn gains that result from changes in 
market prices of these assets. In contrast, nonfinancial investments refer to 
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those investments in which investors or management personnel hold assets 
with the goal of generating cash from business activities.  
 
Table 1. The matrix of characteristics of investments and types of assets  




Financial assets Nonfinancial assets 
Financial investment 
(Expect market price increases) 
Available-for-sale securities, 
derivatives. 
Investment properties, precious 
metals. 
Nonfinancial investment 
(Expect profit from operations) 
Investments in securities of 
subsidiary and associates, 
accounts receivable. 
Land, buildings and equipment, 
inventories. 
(Source: Saito, 2009: 40, Table 2.1) 
 
Similar to the concept of the business model, Sunder (2008) discusses how 
certain economic parameters, including differences in assets, firms, and 
industries, may affect errors in fair valuation. 
 
No valuation rule has minimum mean squared error in general, as a matter 
of principle. Instead, it is a matter of econometrics, and depends on the 
relative magnitudes of the parameters of the economy. Efficient (in the 
sense of minimum mean square error) valuation rules vary across assets , 
firms, and industries. Using known methods, we can discover which rules 
are better in which circumstances (Sunder, 2008: 121). 
 
 Given past empirical investigations and the above discussions , we assume 
that differences in entities’ business models affect the economic consequences 
of fair value accounting and/or the usefulness of fair value information. 
Specifically, for financial investments in which investors or management 
personnel retain assets to achieve gains that result from changes in market 
prices of financial instruments and derivatives (e.g., banks whose assets are 
primarily financial instruments), we predict fair value accounting to be more 
value-relevant. In contrast, for nonfinancial investments in which investors or 
management personnel hold assets with the goal of generating cash from 
business activities from leveraging the assets’ productive capacities (e.g., a 
manufacturing company), we predict fair value accounting to be less value 
relevant. Given these predictions, we propose the following hypothesis, which 
we dub the business model hypothesis: 
 
H1: Economic consequences of fair value accounting vary as a function of 




When considering both valuation usefulness and contracting usefulness, the 
business model hypothesis can be tested with the following hypotheses: 
 
H1a: Fair valuation on assets/liabilities in financial investments increases 
valuation usefulness of accounting information. 
H1b: Fair valuation on assets/liabilities in nonfinancial investments does 
not increase valuation usefulness of accounting information.  
H1c: Fair valuation on assets/liabilities in financial investments increases 
contracting usefulness of accounting information.  
H1d: Fair valuation on assets/liabilities in nonfinancial investments does 
not increase contracting usefulness of accounting information.  
 
2.2. Hardness of accounting measurement 
 
The “hardness” of a given measurement is comprised of that measurement’s 
objectivity and reliability, two important criteria for measures related to 
accounting practices (Ijiri, 1967). The objectivity of an accounting 
measurement is defined as “the consensus among a given group of observers 
or measurers” (Ijiri, 1967: 134-135). Objectivity can be gauged in terms of the 
variability of the accounting measurements (i.e., the measure’s variance). The 
reliability relates to the degree to which actual measures differ from the 
fundamental value (i.e., the measurement errors). Given these 
conceptualizations, measurement hardness is comprised of the variance of the 
accounting measurements and measurement errors.  
 Ijiri (1967) identifies three factors as component elements of accounting 
measurement hardness. First, the input is an object whose key property is to 
be measured. Second, the process is a measurement system that consists of a 
set of rules and instruments. Third, a measurer is a mechanism that applies the 
measurement system to the object. These three factors collectively produce an 
output measure. In terms these components, the hardness of an object refers to 
the degree to which an input parameter is physically and conceptually fixed. 
The hardness of a measurement system relates to the degree to which 
measurement rules and instruments are carefully specified and the degree to 
which those rules and instruments are fixed. Finally, the hardness of a 
measurer is contingent upon the degree to which that measurer is familiar with 
the object and measurement system (i.e., expertise), and/or has an interest in 
output (i.e., incentive to engage in discretional behaviors). These three factors 
are mutually interrelated, so a measurement’s hardness cannot be discussed 
without a consideration of these three factors. 
Given the abundance of empirical evidence and the discussions outlined 
above, we predict that the hardness of measurements affect the economic 
consequences of fair value accounting. Specifically, when measurement 
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hardness is high (e.g., a Level 1 financial instrument with quoted prices and 
an active market in SFAS 157), we expect fair value accounting to be more 
useful. In contrast, when measurement hardness is low (e.g., a Level 3 
financial instrument with a great deal of uncertainty in SFAS 157), we expect 
fair value accounting to be less useful. Thus, we develop the following 
hypothesis, which we refer to as the hardness hypothesis. 
 
H2：The economic consequences of fair value accounting are related to the 
hardness of measurements associated with relevant assets and/or liabilities.  
 
When considering both valuation usefulness and contracting usefulness, the 
hardness hypothesis can be tested with the following sub-hypotheses: 
 
H2a: Fair valuation with high levels of hardness increases valuation 
usefulness of accounting information. 
H2b: Fair valuation with low levels of hardness does not increase valuation 
usefulness of accounting information.  
H2c: Fair valuation with high levels of hardness increases contracting 
usefulness of accounting information. 
H2d: Fair valuation with low levels of hardness does not increase 
contracting usefulness of accounting information. 
 
2.3. Hypotheses matrix 
 
The possibility exists that the hypotheses presented above are mutually 
interdependent. For example, financial institutions whose investments 
primarily consist of financial assets are familiar with those assets and 
estimation methods, so their measurement hardness is high. Contrarily, when 
goodwill is acquired as an object, its hardness is low. However, as purchasers, 
managers are acquainted with those assets and can estimate their value more 
accurately.  
To address the full range of investment intention and object reliability 
combinations, we propose a hypothesis matrix on the basis of (a) the two 
hypotheses presented above, and (b) the matrix of investment characteristics 
and asset types (Saito, 2009). We present this hypothesis matrix in Table 2. 
 




Business model  
hypothesis 
Financial investments 
Financial assets (Level 
1) 





fair value option of 
intangible assets 
Revalued amount of 
long-lived tangible and 




Using this framework, we review empirical studies to test our hypotheses in 
terms of both valuation usefulness and contracting usefulness.  
 
 
3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This study is a hypotheses-testing-style review of extant research from 2000 
to 2012  in the top three accounting journals in the United States: The 
Accounting Review (TAR); Journal of Accounting Research (JAR); and 
Journal of Accounting and Economics (JAE). To identify salient research, we 
first searched for the term “fair value” in Business Source Premier for TAR 
and JAR, and Science Direct for JAE. From the studies that the database 
identified, we chose only empirical studies for inclusion in our analysis. As a 
result of these selection criteria and procedures, our analysis incorporates a 
total of 32 papers. We divided these 32 studies into two groups to isolate 
research that is respectively related to the capital market and contracting.  
 
3.1. Capital market research  
 
Using our hypotheses matrix (see Table 2), we categorize research on the 
capital market into four categories: financial investment/high-hardness, 
financial investment/low-hardness, nonfinancial investment/high-hardness, 
and nonfinancial investment/low-hardness. 
 









Ahmed, Kilic, and Lobo (2006) 
Hodder, Hopkins, and Wahlen (2006) 
Riedl and Sarafeim (2011) 
Song, Thomas, and Yi (2010) 
 
Riedl and Sarafeim (2011) 
Song, Thomas, and Yi (2010) 
Nonfinancial 
investments 
Barth, Hodder, and Stubben (2008) 
Landsman et al. (2011)  
Muller III and Riedl (2001) 
Wong (2000) 
Alciatore, Easton, and Spear 
(2000) 
D’Souza, Jacob, and Soderstrom 
(2000) 
Espahbodi et al. (2002) 
Haan, Heflin, and Subramanyam 
(2007) 






In both the financial investment/high-hardness and financial 
investment/low-hardness categories, several studies focus on the economic 
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consequences of fair value accounting in financial institutions (Ahmed et al., 
2006; Song et al., 2010; Hodder et al., 2006; Riedl and Sarafeim, 2011). 
Ahmed et al. (2006), for example, use data from American banks to 
compare the valuation implications of recognized and disclosed der ivative fair 
value information under SFAS133. They find that while the coefficients 
associated with valuation on disclosed derivatives were not significant, the 
valuation coefficients on recognized derivatives were.  
Also using data from American banks (though limited to the period between 
1996 and 2004), Hodder et al. (2006) investigate the risk relevance of the 
standard deviation of three performance measures: net income, comprehensive 
income, and a measure for full-fair-value income. They find full-fair-value 
income is more than three times as volatile as comprehensive income and 
more than five times as volatile as net income. Further, they indicate that the 
incremental volatility of full-fair-value income is positively related to 
market-model beta, the standard deviation in stock returns, and long-term 
interest-rate beta. These findings suggest that full-fair-value income volatility 
reflects elements of risk that are not captured by measures of volatility for net 
income or comprehensive income.  
Through the use of recently disclosed information related to Level 1, 2, and 
3 financial instruments, Riedl and Sarafeim (2011) explore whether greater 
information risk associated with financial instrument fair values leads to 
higher cost of capital. Their findings show that firms with greater exposure to 
Level 3 financial assets exhibited higher Batas relative to firms exposed to 
Level 1 or Level 2 financial assets. Similarly, Song et al. (2010) use quarterly 
reports from U.S. banking firms to examine the value relevance of fair 
valuation at Levels 1-3 and the effects of corporate governance on the value 
relevance of fair values. They find that the value relevance of Level s 1 and 2 
fair values is greater than the value relevance of fair values at Level 3. Further, 
they demonstrate that the value relevance of fair values is greater for firms 
with strong corporate governance. Taken together, their findings suggest that 
fair valuation with high levels of reliability is more value-relevant than fair 
valuation with low levels of reliability. 
We select four studies to include in the nonfinancial 
investment/high-hardness category (Wong, 2000; Muller III and Riedl, 2001; 
Barth et al., 2008; Landsman et al., 2011). Using over 49,000 firm-year 
observations (excluding utility firms, financial services, and real estate firms), 
Barth et al. (2008) explore the possibility that equity value reflects gains and 
losses associated with changes in debt value. In doing so, the authors seek to 
inform the debate regarding the “paradox” in fair value accounting for 
liabilities: if fair value was recognized, then firms experiencing increases in 
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credit risk would recognize gains because increases in credit risk decrease in 
debt value. In contrast, firms that experience decreases in credit risk would 
suffer losses (Barth et al., 2008: 658). They find that equity returns are 
significantly and negatively correlated to changes in credit risk, but this 
relationship is less pronounced when the firm has more debt. The opposite is 
true for upgrade firms; gains or losses are significantly and positively 
associated with equity return. Their findings suggest that changes in debt 
value are associated with predictable and measurable effects on changes in 
equity value. Stated simply, fair value accounting for liabilities is useful for 
valuation. 
Landsman et al. (2011) examines whether firms’ share prices accurately 
reflect two accounting measures, dirty surplus (DS) and really dirty surplus 
(RDS)
 5
. Unlike dirty surplus, which can be identified in a firm’s financial 
statements, really dirty surplus is unobservable. Landsman and his colleagues 
(2011) find that both dirty surplus and really dirty surplus did not influence 
the forecasting of abnormal comprehensive income. They also find that 
investors appeared to undervalue really dirty surplus. These findings indicate 
that investors fail to understand the lack of the extent to which really dirty 
surplus persists, and over-valuing firms that have large negative really dirty 
surplus. 
Muller III and Riedl (2001) explore the relationship between 
market-makers’ perceptions of information asymmetry across traders in 
British investment property firms and their setting of a wider spread. Their 
results show that market-makers perceive information asymmetry across 
traders to be lower for firms that employ external appraisers relative to those 
that employ internal appraisers. As such, differences in investment property 
appraisers’ respective reliabilities influence perceptions of information 
asymmetry on the part of market makers. 
Wong (2000) examines whether quantitative disclosures related to notional 
amount and fair value of foreign exchange (FX) derivatives  (as required by 
SFAS 119, SFAS 105, and SFAS 107) are associated with the information used 
by investors to assess the sensitivity of equity returns to currency fluctuations 
(i.e., currency exposure). Results from this study are mixed, and provide only 
weak support for predictions related to both the association and usefulness 
tests. 
 In the nonfinancial/low-hardness category, Alciatore et al. (2000) investigate 
write-downs of oil and gas firms’ assets and provide empirical evidence for 
the value relevance of the full-cost ceiling test write-downs, thus providing a 
useful contribution to the then-ongoing debate between the oil and gas 
industry and the SEC
6
. They find a statistically significant correlation 
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between write-down amounts and contemporaneous return, but this 
relationship is less pronounced than the correlation between write-down 
amounts and lagged return. Their findings suggest that although the market 
perceived that some of the decline in asset value occurred in the quarter in 
which the write-down was recorded, much of the share market price 
adjustment due to this decline occurred earlier. 
With a focus on nuclear decommissioning costs in U. S. nuclear power 
plants
7
, D’Souza et al. (2000) examine whether net shareholder liability 
valuation implicitly reflects a utility-specific offsetting factor that 
corresponds to expected future recoveries of these costs in rates. Their 
findings provide information not only about utility-specific portions of 
nuclear decommissioning liabilities, but about total decommissioning costs in 
all nuclear units. Both kinds of information are useful for potential investors.   
Espahbodi et al. (2002) examines the reaction of equity price to 
announcements related to accounting for stock-based compensation. Further, 
the authors assess the value relevance of recognition versus disclosure in 
financial reporting. Through their analyses, they reveal that firms exhibit 
significant abnormal returns around the issuance of (a) Exposure Drafts
8
 that 
propose the mandatory recognition of stock-based compensation costs, and (b) 
a reversal of that proposal. They find that the abnormal returns are most 
pronounced for high-tech firms, high-growth firms, and start-up firms. They 
also find that the stock prices are positively related to the existence of tax loss 
carry-forward, the extent to which stock options are used, and debt constraint 
related to retained earnings. They further find that stock prices are negatively 
associated with noise in stock price performance, free cash flows over total 
assets, and firm size. Their findings indicate that the significance of abnormal 
returns around the reversal of the proposal is consistent with the contracting 
theory, and that market participants differentially value disclosure and 
recognition.  
Hann et al. (2007) compare the value and credit relevance of financial 
statements using fair-value and smoothing models of pension accounting
9
. 
They find that fair-value improved the credit relevance of the balance sheet , 
but it did not improve its value relevance. They also find that unless transitory 
gains and losses are separated from more persistent income components, 
fair-value impairs both the value and credit relevance of the income statement 
and the combined financial statements. These findings suggest that there are 
no incremental informational benefits to adopting a fair-value pension 
accounting model. 
 Henning et al. (2000) examine whether investors distinguish identifiable 
components of goodwill for valuation purposes in the year of acquisition. In 
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their study, they find that investors attach positive and negative weights to 
components of goodwill, and that the going-concern and synergy components 
are significantly and positively valued by the market. In contrast, investors 
negatively value the residual goodwill component. In addition, they did not 
find a significant relationship between returns and the amortization of the 
going-concern or synergy components. Taken together, these findings 
demonstrate that a negative valuation weight on the residual goodwill 
component suggests that investors effectively write off this portion of the 
goodwill asset in the year of the acquisition. 
Kimbrough (2007) investigates the degree to which two mechanisms 
(financial statements recognition of R&D and analyst activities)  lead to the 
public revelation of private information implicit in R&D fair value estimates . 
His analysis shows that the positive relationship between analyst following 
and the market's valuation of R&D capital was strongest for the portion of the 
estimated fair value of R&D capital that was unrecognized by the target prior 
to the merger announcement. 
Riedl (2004) explores the effect of SFAS No. 121 on the characteristics of 
reported long-lived asset write-offs. Findings suggest that write-offs reported 
under SFAS No. 121 are less reflective of firms’ economic  realities than those 
reported prior to the standard. As an alternative possibility, Riedl (2004) 
suggests that because SFAS No. 121’s subjective criteria may enable 
managers to more easily justify their reporting choices, managers may exhibit 
discretion over write-offs more readily after the standard’s adoption.  
 
3.2. Contracting research  
 
Once again using the hypotheses matrix, we classify papers related 
contracting and other research into four categories: financial 
investment/high-hardness, financial investment/low-hardness, nonfinancial 
investment/high-hardness; and nonfinancial investment/low-hardness (see 
Table 6). Although this categorization scheme allows for four categories, we 
failed to find any contracting research that fell under the financial 
investment/low-hardness category.  
 








Badertscher, Burks, and Easton (2012)* 









Dietrich, Harris, and Muller III (2001) 
Zhang (2009)* 
Beatty and Weber (2006) 
Blacconiere et al. (2011) 
Choudhary (2011) 
Comprix and Muller III (2011) 
Dechow, Myers, and 
Shakespeare (2010) 




* Other studies: Were not classifiable into the previous group of literature. 
 
Demerjian (2011) explores the sharp decline in the use of balance 
sheet-based covenants in private debt contracts. He indicates that fair value 
estimates of assets and/or liabilities may introduce bias and noise into 
financial statements (particularly balance sheets) and weaken their usefulness 
for sending accurate liquidation values to lenders. He hypothesizes that 
increases in unverifiable balance sheet adjustments (e.g., fair value estimates 
of assets/liabilities) have made balance sheets less useful for debt contracting. 
To remedy this, his research incorporates the use of the volatility ratio (VR) to 
capture the extent to which balance sheets are adjusted. He finds that 
borrowers with a higher VR are less likely to have balance sheet-based 
covenants. This is consistent with the association between reductions in the 
contracting usefulness of balance sheets and reductions in balance sheet 
covenants.  
Using data from the 1,000 largest U.S. firms over the last 40 years, Dichev 
and Tang (2008) explore the effects of poor matching on the properties of 
accounting earnings. Through this examination, they indicate that although 
the correlation between revenues and contemporaneous expenses is declining, 
the correlation between revenues and non-contemporaneous expenses is 
increasing. They also find strong evidence of increased earnings volatility, 
declining persistence of earnings, and an increased negative autocorrelation 
associated with earnings changes. 
With a focus on the securitization of receivables, Dechow et al. (2010) 
examine three research questions; first, to what extent managers use discretion 
to report upward gains under the fair value accounting rule, second, to what 
extent CEO is compensation sensitive to securitization gains relative to other 
earnings components, third, boards play a monitoring role in determining 
either the size of the gains or the sensitivity of CEO compensation in relation 
to these gains. Their research shows that managers do act opportunistically 
and use the discretion afforded to them under the fair value accounting rules 
for securitization. Their findings also show that better monitoring does not 
reduce earnings management or CEO pay-sensitivity to reported securitization 
gains. Finally, they demonstrate that CEOs are rewarded for the gains they 
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report, and boards do not play a monitoring role. These findings suggest that 
fair value estimates are less reliable or softer when active markets do not 
exist.  
Dietrich et al. (2001) examine the reliability of mandatory fair value 
estimates for U.K. investment property by using a sample of firms in the U.K. 
investment property industry from 1988 to 1996. They define more “reliable” 
fair value estimates as those estimates that have a less conservative bias
10
, 
greater accuracy, and less managerial manipulation. They show that appraisal 
estimates understate actual selling prices. In addition, they also find that fair 
value estimates of investment properties are less-biased and more-accurate 
measures of selling price than respective historical costs. Furthermore, the 
authors demonstrate that managers select an accounting method to report 
higher earnings and time asset sales. They also find that managers exercise 
discretion to smooth reported earnings and changes in net asset value, and to 
boost fair values of investment properties prior to raising new debt. Also, they 
find that monitoring by external appraisers and the Big 6 auditors enhances 
the reliability of appraisal estimates. 
Zhang (2009) examines how the accounting standard for derivative 
instruments (SFAS No.133) influence corporate risk-management behavior. 
She demonstrates that, during the post-SFAS No.133, volatility of cash flows 
and risk exposures related to interest-rate, foreign exchange-rate, and 
commodity price decrease for only firms that fail to reduce their risk exposure 
after initiating derivatives programs.  
In the nonfinancial investments/low-hardness category, Beatty and Weaver 
(2006) investigate decisions related to SFAS No. 142, with a particular focus 
on the trade-off between recording certain current goodwill impairment 
charges below the line and uncertain future impairment charges included in 
income from continuing operations. Their results show that managers’ 
incentives affect their preferences for above-the-line versus below-the-line 
accounting treatment. In addition, they also find that contracting and market 
incentives affect firm’s estimation of goodwill impairment charges. Although 
their sample is very specific, their findings indicate that the reliability of the 
fair value estimate of a goodwill impairment write-off is strongly related to 
managers’ economic incentives.  
Ramanna (2008), similar to Beatty and Weber (2006), also focuses on SFAS 
No. 142. However, his work explores the evolution of SFAS No. 142. His 
findings show that the FASB issued SFAS 142 in response to political pressure 
over its proposal to abolish pooling accounting. Ramanna (2008)’s findings 
also show that lobbying firms (i.e. firms opposed to FASB’s original proposal 
to abolish pooling method) supporting for the SFAS 142 impairment rules 
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used unverifiable discretion opportunistically under this standard.  
Blacconiere et al. (2011) investigate reliability disavowals related to the 
volatility estimates of future stock return (one of the inputs that option pricing 
models require) disclosed under SFAS 123. They refer to voluntary 
disclosures in financial statements that raise questions regarding the reliability 
of fair value estimates (in their study, stock option value estimations) as 
reliability disavowals. Further, they examine whether the disavowals are 
informative or opportunistic. Their findings imply that disavowals inform 
users about the reliability disavowals and managers have an incentive to 
voluntarily disclose reliability estimates to mitigate information asymmetry 
between managers and investors. 
Choudhary (2011) investigates differences in reliability between 
recognition and disclosure regimes by comparing fair values required to 
disclose under SFAS No. 123 with those required to recognize under SFAS 
No.123 R. This research indicates that opportunism increases with recognition 
(relative to disclosure), and that it is associated with incentives to manage 
earnings. His findings suggest that managers may bias recognized values of 
employee stock options differently from disclosed values. This study also 
shows how Level 2 inputs affect the reliability of fair valuation. 
Lee (2008) explores the possibility that outstanding employee stock options 
(ESOs), which represent a firm’s contractual obligation to deliver shares upon 
ESO exercise, provide the useful information for credit-rating agencies. She 
hypothesizes that outstanding ESOs convey two types of cash flow 
information－(1) expected cash flows due to equity infusion (Equity Infusion 
Hypothesis), and (2) expected cash outflows due to probable share repurchase  
(Predicting Repurchase Hypothesis). Her findings support above two 
hypotheses, suggesting that outstanding ESOs convey the useful information 
for credit-rating agencies to assess the issuer’s credit risk.  
 Comprix and Muller III (2011) examine whether employers systematically 
assume downward-biased pension estimates to obtain agreement with 
employees when freezing their defined benefit plans. They find that prior to 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), both expected rate of return and discount rate 
are downward-biased when firms freeze their benefit plans. They also show 
that, after SOX, the downward biases are largely reduced. These findings 
suggest that employers opportunistically bias pension estimates to reduce 
labor costs. In addition, they show that, during the post-SOX period, the act 
can mitigate managers’ opportunistic accounting behaviors.  
 In addition to the studies outlined above, there has been some research that, 
although unclassifiable in our categorization scheme, is nonetheless 
informative. Badertscher et al. (2012), for example, examine whether fair 
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value provisions in U.S. accounting rules unfavorably affected commercial 
banking industry in the recent financial crisis. Their industry-level analysis 
indicates that fair value accounting losses such as other-than-temporary 
impairments minimally influenced regulatory capital, not supporting that the 
fair value provisions caused ‘fire-sells’ of securities. Further, their firm-level 
evidences do not support the hypothesis that banks sell securities at a loss in 
response to capital-depleting charges during the crisis. Their results do not 
support that fair valuation caused bank’s pro-cyclical behavior. 
In another example, Bhat et al. (2011) utilize data of U.S. banks between 
2006 and 2009 to illuminate the relationship between bank holdings of 
mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and MBS prices, and how the easing of 
mark-to-market (MTM) accounting affects the relationship. They focus on 
feedback effect for examining the relationship. Feedback means an increased 
tendency of banks to liquidate asset holdings when they confront liquidity 
driven asset-price decline. They argue that MTM accounting can enhance this 
feedback effect. Their analysis reveals the existence of this feedback effect. 
That is, they find that banks are more likely to sell MBS when market price 
decline. In addition, they find the evidence that the easing of MTM accounting 




Recent academic research in top three accounting journals in the United States 
provides evidence that support our hypotheses for valuation usefulness, but 
empirical evidence related to contracting usefulness is a bit more unclear. 
In the capital market research, empirical evidence from prior studies 
demonstrates that differences in business models (i.e., short-term price 
appreciation investing versus long-term cash flow investing) affect the value 
relevance of fair value information. Our findings are consistent with previous 
research that shows fair value information of securities to lack value relevance 
in the case of nonfinancial institutions that do not hold financial assets for 
short-term buying and selling (Simko, 1999). Further, our findings indicate 
that fair value information of all assets and liabilities is value relevant for 
closed-end mutual funds in which financial assets are held for investment 
(Carroll et al., 2003).  
  In addition, measurement hardness also influences valuation usefulness for 
fair value information. Even with respect to financial assets that are held for 
the purpose of selling, the respective value relevance of Level 1 and Level 2 
fair values are greater than that of Level 3 fair value (Song et al., 2010; Riedl 
and Sarafeim, 2011). Other empirical evidence suggests that firms that possess 
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mechanisms for strong corporate governance increase the reliability of the 
financial reporting process, thus increasing of the value relevance of fair value 
information, particularly at Level 3 (Song et al., 2010). In addition, we find 
evidence that recognized fair value information of which audit quality is 
rather high and disclosed fair value information differ with regard to 
reliability. Further, the former is more value relevant than the latter 
(Espahbodi, et al., 2002; Ahmed et al., 2006). 
  Although our findings show some positive effects of fair value accounting 
for valuation usefulness, we are unable to claim that full fair value accounting 
in financial instruments (even in financial institutions that hold more financial 
instruments) is useful for valuation of accounting information because the 
relationship is confounded by the hardness of accounting measurements. As 
such, we can expect fair valuation of non-financial assets to be less useful 
than fair valuation of financial assets for nonfinancial instruments.  
 Within the contracting research it is difficult to identify empirical evidence 
that provides definitive results related to the business model hypothesis. 
Because we are unable to identify any contracting studies that incorporate 
financial investments gauged by measurements with both high and low 
hardness, we are similarly unable to reasonably predict whether fair value 
effects on contracting usefulness differ as a result of an entity’s business 
model.  
Despite this shortcoming, we identified a number of studies that suggest 
that the hardness of fair value measurements may affect the contracting 
usefulness of accounting information. More specifically, the compositional 
elements of the hardness of accounting measurement such as an object  
(goodwill, employee stock option, pension), a measurement system 
(estimation models for ESO or the discount cash flow model), and a measurer 
(management incentives) may affect contracting usefulness of fair value 
accounting.  
In total, our results suggest that differences in entities business models and 
the hardness of measurements related to fair value accounting affect both 
valuation and contracting usefulness of accounting information. 
Given these findings, this study has clear theoretical and practical 
implications. The operationalization of our hypotheses (H1a-H1d, H2a-H2d) 
provides avenues for future research related to the economic consequences of 
fair value accounting. In addition, this study has implications for accounting 
standard-setting. Our findings suggest that the effect of fair value-oriented 
accounting standards would be limited. For example, our results suggest that 
in marginal cases (e.g., when Level 3 financial assets are held in financial 







This study reviewed recent literature related to the capital market and 
contracting that examined the usefulness of fair value accounting information 
for investors and other related parties. On the basis of past findings, we 
developed two hypotheses that we called the business model hypothesis and 
the hardness hypothesis. The business model hypothesis posits that the 
economic consequences of fair value accounting differ as a function of an 
entity’s business model. The hardness hypothesis explains that the economic 
consequences of fair value accounting vary according to the hardness or 
reliability of measurement tools used to gauge relevant assets and/or 
liabilities.  
 This study primarily represents a comprehensive review of the accounting 
literature. We reviewed fair valuation research in the top three accounting 
journals in the United States and summarized the empirical evidence found 
therein. From this review, we were able to identify some opportunities for 
future research. In particular, the operationalization of our hypotheses 
indicates that several lines of research related to the economic consequences 
of fair value accounting are now available to researchers. Practically, the 
findings of this study can inform accounting standard-setting. Ultimately, our 
findings suggest that the effect of fair value-oriented accounting standards 





1. See Barth et al. (1996); Barth et al. (1998); Cornett et al. (1996); Eccher et al. 
(1996); and Venkatachalam (1996). 
2. Landsman (2007) explores research on (a) value relevance related to fair value 
information of financial instruments, and (b) revaluation of non-financial assets. 
3. Laux and Leuz (2009, 2010) discuss theoretical issues related to the association 
between the financial crisis and fair value accounting. Specifically, Lax and Leuz 
(2010) review archival data from past empirical studies to evaluate the effect of fair 
value accounting on US banks during the financial crisis. 
4. For more detailed discussions related to relevance and reliability, refer to 
Holthausen and Watts (2001); Barth et al. (2001); and Landsman (2007). 
5. Dirty surplus refers to a component of comprehensive income that is 
excluded from reported earnings, and therefore violates clean surplus 
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accounting. Really dirty surplus refers to a scenario in which a firm issues or 
reacquires its own shares in a transaction that does not record the share at fair 
market value. 
6. Under the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), two accounting 
methods for oil and gas firms are allowed- full cost or successful efforts. Under the 
successful efforts method, whereas exploration costs for successful wells are 
recorded as assets, exploration costs for unsuccessful wells are expensed. Under the 
full cost accounting method, exploration costs for both dry and successful wells are 
capitalized. However, the SEC requires full-costs firms that may record dry holes as 
assets to conduct a quarterly impairment test (i.e., the “ceiling test”) on their 
capitalized oil and gas assets. 
7. FASB’s Exposure Draft 158-B, which is the focus of this study, proposes that 
the fair value of a company’s total projected liability associated with future 
decommissioning costs be recognized on the balance sheet at the time the initial 
plant goes into operation. 
8. The FASB issued an Exposure Draft titled Accounting for Stock-Based 
Compensation in June 1993, but the proposal was later reversed. 
9. SFAS No. 87 uses an elaborate smoothing mechanism that amortizes changes to 
the fair value of pension assets and liabilities over remaining employee service, and 
records a stable pension expense. However, this mechanism only recognizes accrued 
or prepaid pension costs on the balance sheet. 
10. They suggest that the “conservative bias may reflect appraisers' and/or 
auditors' incentive to undervalue property to protect themselves from litigation if 
property is sold for less than its appraised value” (Dietrich et al., 2001: 135). 
Therefore, the more conservative fair value estimates of investment properties may 
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